"What Do Reflexive Pronouns Tell Us about Belief? -- a New Moore's Paradox de se, Rationality, and Privileged Access"

Commonsense intuitions about folk-psychological concepts, linguistic intuitions about the semantics and pragmatics of 'believes' sentences, and philosophical views about mental states have resulted in strong philosophical theses about the nature of belief, conscious belief, and a Cartesian "transparency" of the mind. I shall look at logico-linguistic evidence for 'believes' sentences that refutes a basic principle of self-awareness of one's belief-states that is defended by philosopher of mind Sydney Shoemaker and many others. Then I give a philosophical critique that shows why Shoemaker's arguments for that view should never have been expected to succeed in the first place. And I suggest some implications for Richard Moran's use of Moore's Paradox sentences to defend the metaphysical "inner"/"outer" and the epistemological "objective"/"subjective" distinctions and to support the transcendence of the "inner."

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