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2001 Colloquium
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August September October November December |
Abstracts
Wednesday, August 29, 2001 Francisco
Gil-White, Ph.D. "Cognitively
Speaking, If, despite the fact that ethnic essences do not exist, ethnic actors nevertheless represent ethnies as essentialized natural groups, we must understand why. This talk will present and defend the argument that humans process ethnic groups (and a few other related social categories) as if they were species - with the associated essentialism - because their surface similarities to species make them inputs to the living kinds mental module that initially evolved to process species-level categories. The similarities in processing between species and ethnic categories will be explored (the main responsible similarities are category-based endogamy, and descent-based membership), and an evolutionary argument for this pyschological borrowing from 'living kinds' reasoning to the social domain will be defended. In a nutshell, I will argue that thinking about ethnies as if they were species was adaptive in the ancestral environment because it solved problems of inference and coordination in the domain of interactional norms. Co-sponsored by the Departments of Anthropology and Philosophy For a printable version of this file click here
Wednesday,
September 12, 2001 Ezra
Zubrow, Ph.D. "The Origin of Music" This paper reports on the recent results of a joint project between the University of Buffalo and University of Cambridge. There are four results:
For a printable version of this file click here
Wednesday,
September 19, 2001 Leonard
Talmy, Ph.D. University at Buffalo "The Representation of Spatial Structure in Spoken and Signed Language" Linguistic research to date has determined many of the factors that structure the spatial schemas found across spoken languages. It is now feasible to integrate these factors and to determine the comprehensive system they constitute for spatial structuring in spoken language. This system is characterized by several features: It has a relatively closed universally available inventory of fundamental spatial elements that are combined to form whole schemas. It has a relatively closed set of categories that these elements appear in. And it has a relatively closed small number of particular elements in each category, hence, of spatial distinctions that each category can ever mark. An examination of signed language shows that its structural representation of space systematically differs from that in spoken language in the direction of what appear to be the structural characteristics of scene parsing in visual perception. Such differences include the following: Signed language can mark finer spatial distinctions with its inventory of more structural elements, more categories, and more elements per category. It represents many more of these distinctions in any particular expression. It also represents these distinctions independently in the expression, not bundled together into "pre-packaged" schemas. And its spatial representations are largely iconic with visible spatial characteristics. The findings suggest that instead of some discrete whole-language module, spoken language and signed language are both based on some more limited core linguistic system that then connects with different further subsystems for the full functioning of the two different language modalities. For a printable version of this file click here
Wednesday,
September 26, 2001 Kristin
Tjaden, Ph.D. "Acoustic-Perceptual Distinctiveness and Coarticulatory patterns in Dysarthria" The dysarthrias are a group of communicative disorders resulting from impairment to central and/or peripheral nervous system structures important for the motor execution of speech. From a functional viewpoint, speech intelligibility and naturalness may be impaired owing to reduced speed, strength, range, accuracy, and timing of speech movements in the respiratory-laryngeal, velopharyngeal, and oral articulatory mechanisms. Although a great deal of progress has been made in characterizing the speech production deficits associated with the various dysarthrias, vocal tract activity in dysarthria remains poorly understood. The current presentation focuses on oral articulatory impairments associated with Parkinson's disease, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS), and Multiple Sclerosis, as inferred from the acoustic speech signal. In addition to describing how these neurologic diseases affect the articulatory-acoustic working space for individuals' habitual or normal speech mode, changes in the acoustic working space associated with speech rate and vocal intensity manipulations will be discussed. The relationship between the size of the acoustic working space and auditory-perceptual impressions of speech also will be discussed as well as coarticulatory differences for individuals with dysarthria and neurologically healthy speakers. Finally, the theoretical implications of a relationship between coarticulatory patterns in dysarthria and the size of the articulatory-acoustic working space will be considered.. For a printable version of this file click here
Wednesday,
October 3, 2001
Harry Heft, Ph.D.
From "Thing and Medium" to Ecological Psychology: In the middle decades of the 20th century, two psychologists -- James Gibson working in perception, Roger Barker working in social development - separately proposed an ecological psychology that was a radical break from standard approaches in their respective areas. Although each employed the label 'ecological psychology' to describe their contributions, their proposed programs were distinctly dissimilar from each other, both with respect to their problem focus and also with regard to their level of analysis. In keeping with these notable differences, theory and research in each program proceeded independently. And yet, in spite of their notable differences, each program embraced as one of its foundational ideas Fritz Heider's (1926) highly original analysis of 'thing and medium.' This presentation will identify some of the distinctive and significant contributions of each ecological program, examine their common ties to Heider's seminal work, and offer an integrated view of an ecological psychology that functions at both the level of individual-environment interaction and collective social processes. For a printable version of this file click here
Wednesday,
October 10, 2001 Robert
Van Gulick, Ph.D. "Maps, Gaps, and Traps: Metaphors for Understanding Consciousness" The metaphors we use to talk about the problem of consciousness can both illuminate and restrict our understanding. They can reveal otherwise hidden aspects, or blind us to things outside their perspective. The much invoked metaphor of the "explanatory gap" - first coined by Joe Levine - provides a good case study (others might include Chalmer's Hard Problem/ Easy Problem distinction, or Nagel's equation of being a conscious x with "there being something that it's like to be an x".) The gap metaphor is both powerful but ambiguous in ways that can lead us astray if we do not can take care. I will explore the metaphor and its many meanings, in hope to dispel confusion and foster greater understanding of the mind/matter basis of consciousness. For a printable version of this file click here
Wednesday,
October 17, 2001
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm 280 Park Hall North Campus Tamar
Gendler Ph.D. "Philosophical
Implications of Research Recent empirical research concerning children's games of pretense seems to show that they are marked by the presence of two central features, which I call quarantining' and 'fertility'. Quarantining is manifest to the extent that causes within the pretense-episode are taken to have effects only within the pretense-episode (so, for example, the child does not expect the table really to be wet if the child "spills the tea"). Fertility is manifest to the extent that features of the imaginary situation that have not been explicitly stipulated are derivable via features of their real-world analogues (so, for example, the child does expect the table to be wet in the pretence if she up-ends the teapot above its surface). At the same time, from the same early age, it seems that both quarantining and fertility are constrained in crucial ways. Quarantining gives way to 'contagion' in cases of affect-laden imagination (so, for example, a child who imagines a bear on the staircase may be reluctant to go upstairs alone). And fertility gives way to 'unproductivity' as a result of the fundamental incompleteness of the imaginary (so, for example, there may be no fact of the matter (in the pretence) just how much "tea" there is left in the teapot). Exactly when and how these constraints relate to the principles to which they are exceptions raises complicated and interesting questions. In my talk, I will present these distinctions in light of recent empirical research, and discuss some of their implications for a number of issues of current philosophical discussion in epistemology, aesthetics and the philosophy of mind. For a printable version of this file click here
Wednesday,
October 24, 2001 Suzanne
MacDonald, Ph.D. "Studying
Memory and Cognition Exploring memory and cognition in nonhuman primates has traditionally been done in laboratory situations. While labs offer great experimental control, the range of species that can be studied is limited. Zoo animals offer a unique opportunity to examine cognitive processes in a wide variety of species. In this talk, I will focus on my research with prosimians, New and Old World monkeys, and Great Apes. I'll discuss my findings on spatial memory and foraging strategies, as well as my current work on abstract concept discrimination, communication, and social cognition. For a printable version of this file click here
Wednesday, October 31, 2001 K.
Nicholas Leibovic, Ph.D. "Brain and Vision"
For a printable version of this file click here
CANCELLED! Watch for news on a new speaker! Wednesday,
November 7, 2001 Andre
Kukla, Ph.D. "Epistemic Boundedness" A psychological theory represents the mind as epistemically bounded if it is a consequence of the theory that our cognitive organization imposes epistemically significant constraints on the beliefs that we can entertain. Three arguments for epistemic boundedness are evaluated. Two of them-Colin McGinn's argument and the argument from mediocrity-are found to be defective. The third-Jerry Fodor's-underwrite no more than the relatively weak conclusion that we are dialectically justified in presuming that the mind is epistemically bounded when conversing with our cognitive-scientific colleagues. For a printable version of this file click here
Wednesday,
November 14, 2001 Keith
Oatley, Ph.D. "Emotions
and the Fiction is typically highly structured. The goal of its writers can be thought of as offering materials to a reader (or audience member) so that they can construct and run cognitive simulations. Though such simulations run on minds rather than on computers, the analogy is close. Like computer simulations, fictions have aspects that correspond to (a) real-world models and (b) instructions as to how to compute over these models. In literary theory these aspects have been called fabula (the story world, or event structure) and siujhet (plot, or discourse structure). I will discuss two further aspects. One is the suggestion structure, which is based on priming and other such devices; it sets up resonances with the reader and prompts her or his own emotions and memories. The other is the realization: the enactment, or inner performance, of the fictional piece in the mind of reader as she or he runs the simulation in a way that—if the fiction is successful—involves the emotions. I shall present empirical evidence for some of these claims. This evidence includes demonstrations that people do indeed experience emotions when they read short stories, and that these emotions shape their understandings of, and reasoning about, the stories. For a printable version of this file click here
Wednesday, November 28, 2001 Shaun
Gallagher, Ph.D. "Expressive Movement in a Deafferented Subject" Explanations of neonate imitation of facial gestures have been framed in terms of motor ability and intermodal perception (Meltzoff and Moore, 1977; 1993; 1995). Meltzoff and his colleagues have offered explanations that rely on concepts like an innate body schema, perception and action coupling, and the reproduction of movement based on matching proprioception to visual stimulus (Chaminade , Decety, and Meltzoff, in press; Decety, et al., 2001; Gallagher and Meltzoff, 1996). I want to ask whether imitation of facial gestures is given a full account in these terms, or whether there might be some other mechanism that needs to be considered. To provide a framework for this question, I examine a case where gesture is clearly dissociated from certain aspects of normal motor ability, that is, where gesture, as a form of expressive movement, is irreducible to instrumental or locomotive movement. The case is that of IW, a man who lives without the sense of touch and proprioception below the neck. IW has profound problems with both locomotive and instrumental movement. Without proprioception he is not capable of controlling his movement without conscious use of vision and cognitive effort. When he wants to pick up a glass from the table, for example, he must think through his movement, consciously calculating distance, trajectory, grip, pressure, etc. Despite these problems with movement, IW, with and without vision, is capable of conversational gestures that are in most regards normal. I will report on experiments that show in precise terms that this is the case. I will also offer a theoretical account (in contrast to motor theories of gesture) to explain why gestures are not reducible to instrumental or locomotive movement. If gesture is a form of expressive movement that is not reducible to instrumental or locomotive movement, and if imitation of gestures is also a form of expressive movement, then I want to suggest that neonate imitation of facial gesture is not fully accounted for by innate body schemas, or other terms that focus on movement alone. For a printable version of this file click here
Wednesday,
December 5, 2001
2:00 pm - 4:00 pm 280 Park Hall North Campus Allison
Sekuler, Ph.D. "Visual Completion: A Case Study in Grouping and Perceptual Organization" One of the most important goals of vision is to recognize objects so that we can interact appropriately with them. Our everyday experiences suggest that the visual system is finely tuned to achieve this goal: recognition seems to occur instantly and effortlessly. However, research in my lab and others reveals that perceptual organization and recognition are much more complex processes than our phenomenology would lead us to believe. This lecture focuses on one aspect of my research: The perception of partly occluded objects. Because the information reaching our eyes is often incomplete, occlusion represents a huge obstacle to our perception of the world. I will describe evidence that the visual system completes contours and makes use of those completed contours. I will also discuss the effects of spatio-temporal context on visual completion, and I will describe our approach to combining behavioural methods with neuroimaging. Our results suggest that completion acts as a grouping mechanism enabling observers to use the relevant parts of the stimulus more efficiently for shape discrimination and object recognition. In this sense, visual completion is conceptualized not as end in and of itself, but as means to an end. For a printable version of this file click here
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